Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271262 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
QMS Research Paper No. 2022/07
Verlag: 
Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Management School, Belfast
Zusammenfassung: 
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute.
Schlagwörter: 
Social Dilemmas
Public Goods
Position Uncertainty
Voluntary Contributions
Fundraising
Groups
JEL: 
C72
D82
H41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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