Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271556 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
SWP Comment No. 23/2023
Publisher: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
Abstract: 
One year after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, certain assumptions about the utility of cyber operations during wartime can now be put to the test. Russian cyber salvos opened this war, but they failed to achieve their objectives in the face of a resilient cyber defender. Joint cyber/conventional warfighting is still hard to implement due to its uncertain effects, the potential for spill-over, malware development cycles, and differing operational tempos. Cyber operations against Ukraine have not (yet) achieved major strategic effects in reducing Ukraine's capacity to resist. Additionally, Russian information operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences fell on deaf ears. The greatest value of cyber operations therefore still appears to lie in their intelligence and reconnaissance functions.
Subjects: 
cyber operation
cyber attack
cyber forces
cyber capabilities
counter-force capability
cyber warfare
Russia-Ukraine war
Cyber Pearl Harbour
Operation Glowing Symphony
Advanced Persistent Threat
APT
Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine
CERT-UA
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Research Report

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