Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/271658 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1873
Versionsangabe: 
April 18, 2023 (revised version)
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent proposals for a still missing European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) argue in favor of a reinsurance framework. In this paper, we use a regime-switching open-economy DSGE model with bank default to assess the relative efficiency of such a scheme. We find that reinsurance by EDIS is more effective in stabilizing real activity, credit, and welfare than a national fiscal backstop. We demonstrate that risk-weighted contributions to EDIS are welfare-beneficial for depositors and discuss trade-offs policymakers face during the implementation of EDIS. We also find that macroprudential regulation and EDIS can complement each other and that EDIS can prevent bank runs under certain conditions.
Schlagwörter: 
Banking Union
Deposit Insurance
Risk-Sharing
JEL: 
E61
F42
F45
G22
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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