Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/272262 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ICIR Working Paper Series No. 49/23
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We build on Peter et al. (2017) who examined the benefit of testing frequency risk under various information regimes. We first consider testing only severity risk, and whether the principle of indemnity, i.e. the usual contract term that excludes claims payments above the resulting insured loss, affects the insurance contracts offered and purchased. Under information regimes which are less restrictive (in terms of obtaining and using customer information), it is possible for the insurer to offer different contracts for tested and untested individuals. In the absence of the principle of indemnity, individuals will test their severity risk and a separating equilibrium ensues. With the principle of indemnity, given an actuarially fair pooled contract, individuals will not test for severity under less restrictive information regimes; a pooling equilibrium thus ensues. Under more restrictive information regimes, the insurer offers separating contracts. Individuals will test for severity and purchase appropriate contracts. We also consider testing for both frequency and severity risk. The results here are more varied. The highest gain in efficiency from testing results from one of the more restrictive information regimes. Generally under all information regimes, there is a greater gain in efficiency without the principle of indemnity than with the principle of indemnity.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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