Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/275324 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Administrative Sciences [ISSN:] 2076-3387 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 53 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
A fundamental challenge in democracy is how to control civil service organizations. This challenge has been primarily addressed by creating horizontal accountability arrangements, in which independent agencies act as auditors and evaluators of civil service organizations. However, horizontal accountability only partially resolves this control challenge. In this paper, we adopt a design science approach and draw on insights from game theory to develop a set of design principles for controlling civil service organizations. Based on these design principles, a system for controlling civil service staff was created and implemented in a medium-sized Dutch municipality. The results obtained in this municipality are rather promising regarding the enhanced efficiency and transparency of the civil service organization, while the high level of job satisfaction among civil servants is sustained. These findings suggest that the benefits of increased transparency in how civil servants are monitored appear to outweigh the fact that they may have less discretion in their work.
Subjects: 
civil service
control
performance management
public administration
game theory
design science
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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