Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/276227 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
GLO Discussion Paper No. 1325
Verlag: 
Global Labor Organization (GLO), Essen
Zusammenfassung: 
Basu and Van (1998) show that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing if, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. We show that a partial ban may be self-enforcing, but a total one never is, if education is available, and the disutility of child labour can be compensated by the expected utility of future consumption. If some of the work children do is not observable by the government, a ban may be only apparently self-enforcing, or actually counterproductive. If the government wants to re- duce child labour and raise education to the effi cient level, it can borrow from the international credit market to subsidize parents, and tax their children's future wages to pay the loan back with interests.
Schlagwörter: 
Child labour
education
self-enforcing ban
norms
JEL: 
H31
J22
O12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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