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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2214
Verlag: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze self- and joint procurement of countries with heterogeneous demand for a good offered by a price discriminating monopolist. We find that not only countries with low but also with high demand can benefit from committing to jointly procure equal quantities at a uniform price, even if the supplier is capacity constrained. Free-riding of outside buyers as well as too much heterogeneity of insiders make the buyer group unstable. Uniform price procurement without a quantity restriction is only stable with intra-group transfers. We relate our findings to the COVID-19 vaccine procurement of the European Union.
Schlagwörter: 
joint procurement
group purchase
heterogeneous buyer group
vaccineprocurement
price discrimination
JEL: 
C79
D42
L12
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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