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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10410
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a dynamic model that investigates the persistence and evolution of elite-dominated societies, where inherited political capital determines one's social standing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the distribution of exit options in the evolution of political inclusiveness across generations. An elite comparatively more mobile than the masses generally entrenches a politically stratified society, whereas a more widespread distribution of exit options can encourage inclusiveness. Under certain conditions differential mobility may still induce political inclusiveness across generations. Exit options across different political entities lead to a joint evolution of local power structures.
Schlagwörter: 
political dynasties
elite dynamics
exit options
rent-seeking
political spillovers
JEL: 
D72
F42
H26
P16
P48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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