Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279350 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 10599
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Is being informed about nudging detrimental to the effect of the nudge? This paper reports results from an experimental study (n = 623) testing the effects of transparency on the effectiveness of a default nudge while controlling for reactance and decision time. Overall, the data show that more people follow the default if the nudge is made transparent. More importantly, though, effects of transparency differ depending on whether people are fast or slow in their decision making. In particular, (only) slow decision makers react more positively (keeping the default) if nudging is made transparent. Moreover, the data also show an interaction of reactance and decision time in that more reactant subjects making slower decisions respond more negatively (i.e. leave the default more often). Thus, a positive effect of transparency as well as a negative impact of reactance can be established in the data if decision time is accounted for.
Schlagwörter: 
nudging
transparency
reactance
decision time
JEL: 
C90
D90
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.