Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279746 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CORE Discussion Paper No. 2005/38
Publisher: 
Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve
Abstract: 
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of a population that consists of cooperators and defectors, wherein each member of the many pairs of players of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is drawn at random, and the number of descendents positively depends on the payoffs in the game. We demonstrate how an inclination to migrate may be mapped onto the overall evolutionary fitness of the cooperators. The threshold value of the inclination to migrate parameter is obtained. Intensities of migration higher than that value guarantee that in the long run, the population will consist entirely of cooperators. The threshold value is characterized by the payoff parameters lying at the base of the evolutionary dynamics.
Subjects: 
Haystacks-type model
Prisoner's dilemma game
Inclination to migrate
Evolution of cooperation
Taste for migration
JEL: 
A12
A13
D64
R23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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