Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/279746 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CORE Discussion Paper No. 2005/38
Verlag: 
Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve
Zusammenfassung: 
We explore the evolutionary dynamics of a population that consists of cooperators and defectors, wherein each member of the many pairs of players of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game is drawn at random, and the number of descendents positively depends on the payoffs in the game. We demonstrate how an inclination to migrate may be mapped onto the overall evolutionary fitness of the cooperators. The threshold value of the inclination to migrate parameter is obtained. Intensities of migration higher than that value guarantee that in the long run, the population will consist entirely of cooperators. The threshold value is characterized by the payoff parameters lying at the base of the evolutionary dynamics.
Schlagwörter: 
Haystacks-type model
Prisoner's dilemma game
Inclination to migrate
Evolution of cooperation
Taste for migration
JEL: 
A12
A13
D64
R23
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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