Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/281127 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 020.2023
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
For two periods an expert E announces his forecast of the state to a decision-maker D who chooses action. They disagree about the precision of the probability assessments. At the end of period 1 the state is observed. In the last period E makes announcements more extreme than his forecasts. Despite countable equilibria, full revelation is never realised. When in period 1 E is interested in reputation only, the initial equilibrium partition is finite; E makes announcements of greater uncertainty with respect to his forecasts. When E is interested in action too, reputational concerns mitigate exaggerated reports.
Schlagwörter: 
cheap-talk
expert
statistical bias
JEL: 
D81
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
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