Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282040 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 348
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a dynamic screening model where the agent may go bankrupt due to, for example, cash constraints. We model bankruptcy as a verifiable event that occurs whenever the agent makes a per period loss. This leads to less stringent truth-telling constraints than those considered in the existing literature. We show that the weaker constraints do not af- fect optimal contracting in private values settings but may do so with interdependent values. Moreover, we develop a novel method to study private values settings with continuous types and identify a new regularity condition that ensures that the optimal contract is deterministic.
Schlagwörter: 
dynamic screening
bankruptcy
verifiability
mean preserving spread
JEL: 
D82
H57
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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