Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282058 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 366
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference-based motives. Participants expect partners who want to be matched with them to be more cooperative, and are more altruistic themselves. This leads to higher cooperation and larger profits when participants can consider each other's preferences.
Subjects: 
experiment
market design
matching
reciprocal preferences
incomplete information
Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism
JEL: 
C78
C91
C92
D82
D83
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.47 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.