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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 375
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
A large body of literature finds that managerial overconfidence increases risk-taking by financial institutions. This paper shows that financial regulation can be effective at mitigating this type of risk. Exploiting regulatory changes introduced after the financial crisis as a natural experiment, I find that overconfidence-induced risk-taking decreases in financial institutions subject to stricter regulation. Following the easing of these regulations, overconfidence-induced risk-taking increases again. These findings confirm the effectiveness of financial regulation at correcting overconfident behavior, but also suggest that the impact fades away quickly once removed.
Schlagwörter: 
overconfidence
risk
regulation
financial sector
JEL: 
G28
G32
G38
G40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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