Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282074 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 382
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
laboratory experiment
field experiment
auction
BIN-auction
Buy-It-Now auction
BIN-price
Buy-It-Now price
combined mechanism
JEL: 
C72
C91
D44
D82
L1
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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