Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282086 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 394
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
I study a cheap talk model between a buyer and a seller with two goods for sale. There is two-sided (independent) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences to the seller. In the second stage, the seller communicates the quality of the goods to the buyer. When the buyer's preference is about which attribute common to both goods she prefers, the seller strictly benefits from the buyer communicating her preferences. Whereas when the buyer's preference is about which good she prefers, this is never the case.
Subjects: 
cheap talk
strategic communication
product recommendations
JEL: 
D82
L15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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