Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/282092 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 400
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China's implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors' violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.
Schlagwörter: 
delegation
responsibility-shifting
One-Child policy
JEL: 
D02
D04
D90
J18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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