Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284768 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [ISSN:] 1530-9134 [Volume:] 29 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 910-931
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We analyze collusive outcomes under different pricing schemes in a differentiated product market in which customers have elastic demand. Starting with a situation in which firms can set two‐part tariffs to price discriminate, we consider two policy interventions that ban price discrimination: Firms must set (a) linear prices or (b) fixed fees. We find that collusion at maximum prices becomes harder to sustain under linear prices. By contrast, the analysis shows that the fixed fees policy facilitates collusion at maximum prices. The results have important implications for competition policy.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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