Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/284878 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 2822
Publisher: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Abstract (Translated): 
To shape or to choose an appropriate regime of civil service is an old problem. The modern State in the West adopted two regimes in its first experience, the sale of public offices and favoritism. History and situational-strategic analysis derive lessons from that experience. In the first option, the State tends to lose control of those functions of public interest and to favor the interests of the buyers of public offices. In the second option, favoritism tends to submit society to a small social stratum. This stratum controls the occupation of positions of authority in the State, the legal norms, the actions of regulation, as well as other institutions that may give economic advantages or benefits of other kinds.
Subjects: 
regimes of civil service
sale of public offices
favoritism
JEL: 
D73
A13
B40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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