Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286737 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Central European Journal of Operations Research [ISSN:] 1613-9178 [Volume:] 30 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1279-1305
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
In the present contribution, the innovative nonlinear state marginal price vector model introduced in Toll and Kintzel (CEJOR 27(4):1079–1105, 2019) (plus Errata herein) is enriched to include budgeting problems under agency conflicts. Under asymmetric information, a company owner as principal can only rely on information transmitted to her from her managers as agents. In the related modeling, it is assumed that slack and capital rationing are optimal. The governing budgeting relations are integrated into a nonlinear framework furnished by a multi-period newsvendor approach and are solved numerically by means of a two-step valuation procedure based on two successive nonlinear convex optimizations. The capital market is assumed to be imperfect. As case study, the M&A-valuation case of a merger of two IT-service companies is considered subjected to optimal combined dimensioning of capacities and budgets under stochastic demand. On balance, by addressing agency conflicts within the well-established nonlinear framework, the practical application field of the valuation procedure is widened.
Subjects: 
Investment analysis
Company/business valuation
Nonlinear convex programming
Agency conflicts
Asymmetric information
Multi-period newsvendor/newsboy model
IT-service companies
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.