Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286835 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Evolutionary Economics [ISSN:] 1432-1386 [Volume:] 31 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1277-1290
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.
Schlagwörter: 
Volunteering
Stochastic stability
Finite populations
Mixed strategies
JEL: 
C73
D62
H41
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
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