Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286875 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 503-528
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
In this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.
Subjects: 
Antitrust
Collusion
Patent challenges
Patent settlements
Pharma
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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