Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/286982 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Review of Managerial Science [ISSN:] 1863-6691 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 933-967
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
This study analyzes mergers and acquisitions (M&A) payment methods in large transactions of public U.S. acquirers between 2009 and 2016. While we find consistent with previous evidence that asymmetric information between acquirers and targets significantly influences the choice of M&A payment methods, we show that contrary to prevailing findings in the literature, acquirers cannot exploit their overvaluation through stock-financed M&A at targets' disadvantage. In addition, when facing larger uncertainty in the counterparty's valuation, a higher ratio of cash is applied in M&A payment. Our results document that both acquirers and targets are rational in choosing M&A payment methods.
Schlagwörter: 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
Choice of payment methods
Rational payment design
Equity overvaluation and misvaluation
Information asymmetry
JEL: 
G14
G50
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
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