Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287324 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics and Finance [ISSN:] 1938-9744 [Volume:] 46 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 188-206
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates the incentives of a credit rating agency (CRA) to generate accurate ratings under an advertisement-based business model. To this end, we study a two-period endogenous reputation model in which a CRA can increase the precision of its ratings by exerting effort. The CRA receives a revenue not from rating fees, as is standard in the literature, but through online advertising. We show that the advertisement-based business model provides sufficient incentives for the CRA to improve the precision of signals at intermediate levels of reputation. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which truthful reporting is incentive compatible.
Schlagwörter: 
Credit rating agencies
Rating precision
Information acquisition
Advertisement
Reputation
JEL: 
D82
G24
L15
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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