Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287337 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Economics [ISSN:] 1861-8928 [Volume:] 91 [Issue:] 9 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1387-1430
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Crowdfunding platforms offer project initiators the opportunity to acquire funds from the Internet crowd and, therefore, have become a valuable alternative to traditional sources of funding. However, some processes on crowdfunding platforms cause undesirable external effects that influence the funding success of projects. In this context, we focus on the phenomenon of project overfunding. Massively overfunded projects have been discussed to overshadow other crowdfunding projects which in turn receive less funding. We propose a funding redistribution mechanism to internalize these overfunding externalities and to improve overall funding results. To evaluate this concept, we develop and deploy an agent-based model (ABM). This ABM is based on a multi-attribute decision-making approach and is suitable to simulate the dynamic funding processes on a crowdfunding platform. Our evaluation provides evidence that possible modifications of the crowdfunding mechanisms bear the chance to optimize funding results and to alleviate existing flaws.
Schlagwörter: 
Crowdfunding
Overfunding
Internalization of externalities
Pigouvian tax
Agent-based modeling
Market engineering
JEL: 
C63
D47
D61
D62
G41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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