Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/287844 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Business Finance & Accounting [ISSN:] 1468-5957 [Volume:] 50 [Issue:] 3-4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 795-819
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We study the driving forces behind the positive association observed between corporate investment and stock market valuation, and how they interact with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. We build a dynamic model where managers use investment choices to influence investors' opinions about firms' future prospects and increase the market valuation. The incentives to manipulate the valuation processes increase with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. Our empirical findings support the model's predictions that the tendency of using investment to boost market valuation is stronger when managerial stock ownership is high or when earnings quality is low (i.e., there is strong reliance on investment for information).
Subjects: 
compensation
equity incentives
executives
financial report quality
investment
investment informativeness
misvaluation
stock market
top management team
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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