Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288049 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] British Journal of Management [ISSN:] 1467-8551 [Volume:] 34 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1974-1991
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We investigate the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) marital status and their tendency to profit from insider trading. We argue that marriage can constrain CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour, which could increase litigation risk, and show that married CEOs earn lower insider trading returns compared to unmarried CEOs. Insider trades can be identified as either routine or opportunistic. We also find that married CEOs are less likely to engage in opportunistic trades, and they earn lower insider trading returns in firms with weaker corporate governance and higher information asymmetry. Our empirical results remain robust after accounting for several endogeneity tests.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.