Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288062 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 71 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 855-882
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long‐distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth‐telling behavior and restores first‐best welfare.
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