Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288218 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] International Economic Review [ISSN:] 1468-2354 [Volume:] 64 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1649-1683
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
In buyer–seller relationships, offering trade credit to buyers fosters long‐term collaboration but seller provision varies systematically as relationships evolve. We study the optimal provision dynamics of trade credit when the seller's information about the buyer is incomplete. We show how the interaction of self‐enforcing relational contracts and formal contracts determines optimal payment contract choice. We find that payment contracts can be interpreted as screening technologies and imply distinct learning opportunities about the buyer's type. In line with empirical evidence, the model predicts that all transitions between payment terms lead to seller trade credit provision in the long run.
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