Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288351 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economics of Governance [ISSN:] 1435-8131 [Volume:] 21 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 237-244
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA’s Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.
Schlagwörter: 
IMF executive board
IMF quota reform
Weighted voting
Voting procedures
Non-binary voting
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Dokumentart: 
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