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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Social Choice and Welfare [ISSN:] 1432-217X [Volume:] 55 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 301-323
Verlag: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Is there a link between public debt and wealth inequality? Could government bondholders use intra-generational redistribution strategically to make the repayment of debt politically viable? We reconsider the model of Tabellini (J Polit Econ 99:335–357, 1991) and expose the role of coordination and divide-and-conquer. By coordinating their bond investments, the old generation splits up the young generation and secures a majority favoring debt repayment. Coordination therefore mediates the impact of wealth inequality on public debt. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and find that subjects often coordinate to exploit the link between inter- and intragenerational redistribution. Hence, coordination plays an important role in the strategic creation and exploitation of minorities, and thus in the accumulation of public debt.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Public Finance
International Political Economy
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
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