Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288441 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Social Choice and Welfare [ISSN:] 1432-217X [Volume:] 56 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 467-485
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
The current literature on mechanism design in models with social preferences discusses social-preference-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable in any environment with social preferences. The literature also discusses payoff-information-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable for any belief and higher-order beliefs of the agents about the payoff types of the other agents. In the present paper, I address the question of whether deterministic mechanisms that are robust in both of these dimensions exist. I consider environments where each agent holds private information about his personal payoff and about the existence and extent of his social preferences. In such environments, a mechanism is robust in both dimensions only if it is ex-post implementable, i.e., only if incentive compatibility holds for every realization of payoff signals and for every realization of social preferences. I show that ex-post implementation of deterministic mechanisms is impossible in such environments; i.e., deterministic mechanisms that are both social-preference-robust and payoff-information-robust do not exist.
Subjects: 
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Public Finance
International Political Economy
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
Social Policy
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.