Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288446 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Environmental Economics and Policy Studies [ISSN:] 1867-383X [Volume:] 23 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer Japan [Place:] Tokyo [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 467-493
Verlag: 
Springer Japan, Tokyo
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of the introduction of adaptation on climate negotiation. The model expands the existing literature by considering a double relation between the two strategies. The common assumption that higher mitigation decreases the marginal benefit of adaptation and vice versa is enriched allowing for the possibility that mitigation, leading to lower and more manageable damages, determines a greater effectiveness of adaptive measures. We find the possibility for adaptation and mitigation to be strategic complements and not, as commonly believed, substitutes. Yet, as already known from the literature, the presence of adaptation can determine upward-sloping mitigation reaction functions regardless of the strategic relationship between mitigation and adaptation. When this is the case, the grand coalition can form. Nonetheless, large participation can induce substantive welfare gains only if adaptation and mitigation are strategic complements.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate change
Adaptation effectiveness
Mitigation-adaptation strategic relation
International environmental agreements game
JEL: 
C71
D62
D74
F53
H41
Q54
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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