Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/288449 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Game Theory [ISSN:] 1432-1270 [Volume:] 49 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Berlin, Heidelberg [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1129-1142
Publisher: 
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.
Subjects: 
Finitely repeated games
Pure strategy
Observable mixed strategies
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Limit perfect folk theorem
JEL: 
C72 and C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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