Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289015 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Review of Industrial Organization [ISSN:] 1573-7160 [Volume:] 58 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 431-454
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This article merges theoretical literature on non-controlling minority shareholdings (NCMS) in a coherent model to study the effects of NCMS on competition and collusion. The model encompasses both the case of a common owner holding shares of rival firms as well as the case of cross ownership among rivals. We find that by softening competition, NCMS weaken the sustainability of collusion under a greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. Such effects exist, in particular, in the presence of an effective competition authority.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusion
Common ownership
Cross ownership
Minority shareholdings
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