Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289825 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 495
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We study an agency model with vertical hierarchy - the principal, the prime-agent and the sub-agent. The principal faces a project that needs both agents' services. Due to costly communication, the principal receives a report only from the prime-agent, who receives a report from the sub-agent. The principal can directly incentivize each agent by setting individual transfers (insourcing), or sets only one overall transfer to an independent organization in which the prime-agent hires the sub-agent (outsourcing). We show that insourcing is always optimal when the principal can perfectly process the prime-agent's report. When the principal's information process is limited, however, outsourcing can be the prevailing mode of operation. In addition, insourcing under limited information process is prone to collusion between the agents, whereas no possibility of collusion arises with outsourcing.
Schlagwörter: 
information process
sourcing policy
vertical structure
JEL: 
D86
L23
L25
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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