Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/289959 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-1370
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a quantitative theory of prices in firm-to-firm trade with bilateral negotiations and two-sided market power. Markups reflect oligopoly and oligopsony forces, with relative bargaining power as weight. Cost pass-through elasticities into import prices can be incomplete or complete, depending on the exporter's and importer's bargaining power and market shares. In U.S. import data, we find that U.S. importers have substantial market power and disproportionate leverage in price negotiations. The estimated model produces accurate predictions of the impact of Trump tariffs on pair-level prices. At the aggregate level, ignoring two-sided market power could exaggerate tariff pass-through by about 60 percent.
Schlagwörter: 
Market power
Global value chains
Pass-through
International trade
JEL: 
F12
F13
F14
F62
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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