Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290094 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-1294
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the advantages, trade-offs, and challenges of employing a centralized rule to determine the allocation of teachers to schools. Data come from the centralized teacher assignment program in Ecuador, "Quiero ser Maestro," conducted by the Ministry of Education. Notably, in 2019 the program transitioned from a priority based algorithm to a strategy proof mechanism, similar to the change introduced in Boston in 2005 to assign students to schools. Using the reported preferences, we conduct a counterfactual analysis and nd substantive evidence that the adjustment in algorithm resulted in greater efficiency for the school system. However, in contrast to the Boston case, we nd the benefits stem from increasing the competition for positions among teachers, rather than by the introduction of a strategy-proof mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
Education
Education Institution
Teacher
Teacher Distribution
JEL: 
I28
H39
M51
H41
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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