Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/293875 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital [ISSN:] 2199-1235 [Volume:] 52 [Issue:] 4 [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 527-536
Publisher: 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
Abstract: 
We present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process. Our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion. Empirical evidence supports that proposition. The choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process.
Subjects: 
Budget systems
Government expenditures and deficits
Collective choice
JEL: 
H61
H62
D71
D73
H72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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