Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/293934 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital [ISSN:] 2199-1235 [Volume:] 55 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 203-226
Verlag: 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This study tests the hypothesis that the target firms are involved in earnings management activities in quarters leading to a takeover announcement. Using a sample of 3,455 Chinese listed firms that are targets of successful acquisitions over the period 2007–2020, and for a matched sample of non-targets, we find that target firms manipulate earnings in quarters leading to the announcement date. Further, we find evidence of a negative relationship between earnings management and short-term gains to shareholders. Our result remains robust after controlling for various deal characteristics. The study also suggests that pre-merger earnings management in target firms is not fully anticipated by the market before the takeover announcement. We find no evidence of earnings management immediately after the announcement quarter.
Schlagwörter: 
Earnings Management
Takeovers
Short-Term Gains
JEL: 
G14
G34
M41
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Dokumentart: 
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