Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/294023 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies [ISSN:] 1468-5965 [Volume:] 62 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 487-507
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse-engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.
Subjects: 
crisis bargaining
EU foreign and security policy
EU‐Russian relations
Syria
Ukraine
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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