Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/294102 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Research on Management and Business Economics (ERMBE) [ISSN:] 2444-8834 [Volume:] 28 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 100197 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationships among the influence of the largest shareholder, the entry mode of foreign direct investment companies in Korea, and subsidiary divestitures to demonstrate how the government's FDI policies can work as a moderator. Using data from 468 foreign manufacturing firms that set up plants in Korea through FDI between 2008 and 2011, a survival analysis was performed using the Cox proportional hazards model. The statistical results suggest that the possibility of foreign subsidiary divestiture increased with the level of influence held by the company's largest shareholder. Also, the entry mode of mergers and acquisitions was more likely than the greenfield entry mode to result in foreign subsidiary divestiture. Lastly, the host country's FDI policies moderate the relationship between the influence of the largest shareholder and foreign subsidiary divestiture.
Subjects: 
Entry mode
Foreign investment inducement policy
Foreign subsidiary divestiture
Largest shareholder
JEL: 
F23
G38
M16
O25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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