Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/294195 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Cogent Business & Management [ISSN:] 2331-1975 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2156086 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-26
Publisher: 
Taylor & Francis, Abingdon
Abstract: 
Audit quality is a strong external monitoring mechanism to protect the interest of the owners according to agency theory. The auditor choice research has paid more attention to the audit committee overall but has overlooked the unique agency context of audit committee's chairman characteristics on the audit quality especially on auditor choice. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the audit committee's chairman characteristics on the auditor choice. The sample of 111 firms listed on the ACE market was used to test the hypotheses. Using logistic regression, this study finds that only the audit committee's chairman tenure and busyness are significant factors that influence the auditor choice. Whereas, the audit committee's chairman ethnicity, expertise and qualification have no significant influence on the auditor choice. These results have theoretical implications for the alignment and entrenchment hypotheses of the agency theory and practical implications for the regulators to improve the audit committee's structure and regulations.
Subjects: 
ACE market Malaysia
Audit committee's chairman characteristics
Auditor choice
JEL: 
G34
M42
D25
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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