Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/294958 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Junior Management Science (JUMS) [ISSN:] 2942-1861 [Volume:] 6 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 408-423
Verlag: 
Junior Management Science e. V., Planegg
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the effect of large institutional owners on accounting for goodwill and its resulting impairment charges. Economies of scale predict stronger incentives for large institutional owners to engage in monitoring. Employing a multivariate linear probability model on a sample of U.S. companies with goodwill on their balance sheets during the period from 2009 to 2019, I find that the likelihood of an impairment is more strongly related to an expected impairment when the share of equity held by the firm's largest institutional owners is higher. Results prove to be economically meaningful and are generally robust to different specifications. This evidence is consistent with the active monitor hypothesis by large shareholders to protect their significant investments.
Schlagwörter: 
Goodwill accounting
goodwill impairment
institutional ownership
ownership concentration
monitoring
FASB
SFAS 142
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.32 MB
944.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.