Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295785 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16762
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In this paper we exploit the introduction in February 2018 of a new paid parental leave program to care for a seriously ill child in Chile (SANNA) to identify the role of both economic incentives and gender norms on families' decisions regarding market versus home production specialization. To measure the impact of economic incentives, we utilize the design of the SANNA program, which covers the beneficiary's wages up to a specific threshold, beyond which the benefit remains fixed. The efficient allocation of this benefit depends on the income levels of family members and whether their income exceeds the threshold. To investigate the role of gender norms, we compare the effect of economic incentives among older, more traditional families and younger families. Our results indicate that both gender norms and economic incentives affect parental leave allocation. We estimate that older families pay a cost of USD 1,200 for adhering to traditional gender norms compared to younger families.
Subjects: 
parental childcare
gender identity norms
gender wage gap
JEL: 
D13
J22
J16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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