Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295791 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16768
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus ('pie size'). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on the information players have. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates.
Subjects: 
bargaining
asymmetric information
menstrual cycle
biological factors
JEL: 
C78
C91
D87
J16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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