Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295799 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16776
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Many cities with school choice programs employ algorithms to determine which applicants get seats in oversubscribed schools. This study explores whether the New Orleans placement algorithm favored students of certain races or socioeconomic classes via its use of priorities such as geographic and sibling priority. We find that when Black and White applicants submitted the same first-choice request for kindergarten, Black applicants were 9 percentage points less likely to receive it, while students in poverty were 6 percentage points less likely to receive a first-choice placement than their peers. We examine these priorities and simulate placements under alternate policies.
Schlagwörter: 
school choice
algorithm
equity
access
JEL: 
I24
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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