Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295832 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16809
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a number of axioms such a measure should satisfy and show that they characterise a unique function. The principle underlying this measure is that the influence of a player can be assessed according to how much changes in this player's preferences affect outcomes. Considering specific classes of games, our approach nests existing measures of power. We present applications to cartel formation, the non- cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining power
non-cooperative games
JEL: 
C72
C78
D01
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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