Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/295835 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 16812
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
Subjects: 
performance appraisal
calibration panels
group decision-making
real effort
incentives
JEL: 
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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